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Scotland's Appeal Court, the Inner House, has decided
in the case of Ritchie Brothers (PWC) Limited -v- David Philp
(Commercials) Limited that a "late" adjudicator's
decision is invalid. This decision overturned that of the judge
who first heard the debate on this case. Unusually, the decision
was not unanimous, and was reached by a majority of 2:1.
The decision provides authoritative guidance on this
point in Scotland, but is possibly at odds with the law in England.
Factual Background
Ritchie, the contractor, sought to enforce an adjudication
decision in its favour against Philp, the employer. The adjudication
had proceeded under the Scottish Scheme for Construction Contracts.
The adjudicator's decision had been issued 11 days beyond the expiry
of the prescribed 28 day period (and, in fact, 4 days beyond a purported
retrospective extension granted by Ritchie).
The adjudicator's decision was upheld by the judge
at first instance on the basis that his jurisdiction continued until
a fresh adjudication notice was served by one of the parties. The
end of the 28 day period did not bring an end to the adjudicator's
jurisdiction.
Appeal Arguments
Philp maintained that the 28 day period had to be
complied with. If an adjudicator realised he was going to be late
in issuing his decision, he could seek an extension of the decision
period.
Ritchie, on the other hand, argued that the Scheme
does not expressly require an extension to be granted in advance;
that jurisdiction continues until a fresh adjudication notice is
served; and that the decision remained binding despite a procedural
error. Ritchie's fallback position was that the delay was immaterial
(following the earlier case of St Andrews Bay v
HGB)
The Majority Decision
The Lord-Justice Clerk (with Lord Nimmo Smith concurring)
held that the adjudicator's jurisdiction automatically expired after
28 days. Any extension to that 28 day period required to be granted
before it expired. The court considered that the time limits in
the Scheme and the 1996 Act are mandatory and not merely directory.
The majority view refers to the onus on adjudicators,
lawyers and other parties involved in an adjudication to act in
accordance with the prescribed timetable. According to the court,
adjudicators ought to be able to assess their prospects of meeting
the 28 day deadline as soon as papers are received. If there is
any doubt, an extension ought to be requested.
The Dissenting Voice
Lord Abernethy agreed with the first instance decision,
pointing to the wasted time and expense which would flow from the
unenforceability of the adjudicator's decision.
The English Position
In the case of Barnes & Elliot -v- Taylor
Woodrow it was held that the adjudicator required to reach his
decision and communicate it in writing to the parties within the
time limit. A very short delay in communicating the decision to
the parties would be excusable, but a longer delay would not be.
In the more recent case of Simons Construction
-v- Aardvark, the decision of the adjudicator was issued 8 days
late. The court held that the decision of an adjudicator was binding
whenever it was given, provided that the adjudication agreement
had not been terminated for failure to produce a decision, and that
a fresh adjudication notice had not been issued by one of the parties.
The law in England on this point is therefore - at
the present time at least - unsettled. Would the English Court of
Appeal follow the same approach as its Scottish counterpart? Our
view is that this is likely.
Practice Points
- Adjudicators should ensure that their decision
is reached and communicated to the parties within the relevant
time limit.
- The need for an extension ought to be considered
from the very outset, by the adjudicator and the parties, and
addressed before the initial 28 day period expires. Referring
parties and those acting for them should err on the side of caution
when deciding whether to allow an extension within the 14 day
"referring party" period and how much longer to give
the adjudicator to reach a decision.
- Other time limits in the 1996 Act (or their
contractual equivalents) are likely to be strictly construed by
the courts if the Ritchie v Philp approach is adopted
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